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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a new approach to motivation theory based on a cognitive per-
spective: the concept of valuation. Motivation and valuation are reviewed and discussed 
here using an environmental, developmental and evolutionary perspective. We argue that 
 * The author are grateful to two anonymous referees for their precious comments on an 
earlier version of the paper, and to Dr. Suellen Crano for her precious help in the revision of 
the English text.
S.J. Mercado-Doménech - G. Carrus - A. Terán-Álvarez-Del-Rey - S. Pirchio
ECPS Journal – 16/2017
http://www.ledonline.it/ECPS-Journal/
78
motivation could be approached as one of the various mechanisms that compose cognitive 
processes, being related to the adaptive value of objects, situations, or settings. Motivation 
and valuation are proposed as markers of the survival value of perceived, imagined, or con-
ceptualized objects of cognition. In this manner, motivation can be conceived as the product 
of a complex cognitive computation that determines the adaptive value of our cognitions, 
and provides an evaluative response. From this perspective, we discuss the perceptual, cogni-
tive, and symbolic dimensions of the valuation process. Finally, we discuss the implications 
for possible future developments of basic and applied research in the domain of environ-
mental psychology and environmental education.
Keywords: Cognition, Environmental education, Environmental psychology, 
Motivation, Perception, Valuation.
1.  Introduction
Accounting for human and non-human behaviour has been one of the aspi-
rations of the thinkers of all times. At the end of 19th century, the approach 
shifted from philosophical enquiry to a scientific approach, centred on 
empirical investigation and systematic verification. From the second half of 
the 20th Century, the cognitive perspective has been identified as the most 
successful and accepted means for explaining social behavioural processes of 
different species, including humans (Chomsky, 1959; Neisser, 1967; Ander-
son, 1985; Eysenck, 1990) 
Within this frame, behaviour has been explained mainly in terms of 
cognition and motivation. Cognition is the explanation of how individuals 
establish contact with reality and construct representational worlds that oper-
ate in reality; motivation is what leads organisms to choose certain courses of 
behaviour over others.
In this paper, we offer a new approach to motivation theory, based on a 
cognitive perspective: the concept of valuation. Motivation and valuation are 
reviewed and discussed according to an environmental, developmental and 
evolutionary perspective. We do not aim to criticize the previous literature in 
this field, but rather to reinterpret part of its main findings, using an applied 
perspective. We argue that motivation could be approached as one of the 
various mechanisms that compose cognitive processes, being related to the 
adaptive value of objects, situations, or settings. It can be seen as a marker of 
the survival value of perceived, imagined, or conceptualized objects of cogni-
tion. From this perspective, it is a cognitive dimension, similar to perceiving 
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or understanding any dimension, such as size or the brightness or loudness of 
a stimulus. In this view, however, motivation can be conceived as the product 
of a complex cognitive computation that determines the adaptive value of 
our cognitions and provides an evaluative response. This computation may 
be either innate, or learned through experience.
Starting from the concept of valuation used by classical authors to explain 
motivation (Lewin, 1936; Kelly, 1955; Beck, 1964), we propose a theoretical 
schema that aims at explaining this concept using three levels of processing: 
perception, imagination and abstraction. Our proposal identifies a valuation 
dimension for each one. We also discuss the process of phylogenetic evolution, 
which goes through these three levels, and that ontogenetic development, at 
least in humans, re-enacts this sequence, from perception, to imagination to 
abstraction. This is consistent with the levels and stages proposed by devel-
opmental psychologists adopting an individual (e.g., Piaget, 1954) or socio-
constructionist approach (e.g., Bruner, 1990). A fundamental concept in the 
explanation of behaviour is the notion of information, which plays a key role 
in the explanation of the phylogenetic development of cognition. 
While it is true, as Lewin (1951) or Gestalt Theorists have main-
tained, that animals live immersed in an energetic field (stimulus field), the 
importance of such a notion is that, as energy carries information from its 
direct or indirect sources, it is simultaneously an informational field. Conse-
quently, organisms do not respond to the energies themselves (stimuli), but 
to the information carried by such energies. Therefore, animals, including us 
humans, live surrounded by an informational field to which they respond.
We argue that a first stage in the development of cognition was the 
evolution of the capacity to use the information carried by the energies about 
their source, to form a representation of reality. That is, animal organisms 
use the information carried by energies, to form a representation of matter’s 
shape, position, movement, type of substance, and energetic state. That per-
ception is the construction of a virtual reality model (representation), related 
to the surrounding reality itself, using the informational field as the source 
for that construction process. 
A second stage is constructing a virtual reality model when information 
is no longer available from direct stimuli. That is, when the energies that 
bring the information from a given source are no longer available, the organ-
ism is capable of constructing or maintaining the virtual reality model that 
was built when the energies were present. This process goes from an exten-
sion of the visual perceptual processing to include time dependent processes, 
like the perception of movement, up to the creative production and manipu-
lation of imaginal representations, generated without reference to a specific 
previous experience. 
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Third, virtual reality representations are used to generate abstract ones. 
This third stage uses the selective attention capacity of animals to generate 
prototypes that have the common traits of objects, situations, or processes 
that have essential shared properties. Then, it is possible to operate on such 
abstract representations, like concepts, to relate them in different ways and 
generate even more abstract ones, in which the common traits are con-
cepts themselves. That is, the cognitive process known as abstract thinking. 
This last level also is related closely to language, which is a way of sharing 
experiences between persons (as it is only present in Homo Sapiens), caus-
ing the emergence of intersubjective processes and cultures. Albeit different, 
language and thought strictly are interdependent and related entities, as it 
was proposed by the historical-cultural and ecological approaches to human 
development (e.g., Bronfenbrenner, 1979; Vygotsky, 1964). Language is used 
to convey the other two levels of information processing. Thus, language and 
discourse in human interaction represents a fundamental aspect to consider 
for understanding human behaviour and human development (e.g., Potter, 
1998 and 2003) especially in current multilingual and multicultural societies 
(e.g., Pirchio et al., 2015; Pirchio et al., 2017). In the following sections, 
we examine the developmental processes of these different stages through an 
evolutionary perspective.
2.  Valuation stages in evolution 
The development of the nervous system during phylogenetic evolution was 
related to the heterotrophic way of adaptation of animals, which used infor-
mation to react to the distribution of matter in their living ecosystems. The 
evolution of these capacities allowed animals to develop more efficient sys-
tems of behavioural control, enabling living beings to move themselves in the 
pursuit of food and water sources (Williams, 1966). As carnivorous animals 
and predators evolved, these operations became more complicated, requiring 
more complex patterns of behaviour and skills, that we commonly define 
as hunting. The reason for this increasing difficulty and complexity is that 
prey, which in turn evolved and acquired more efficient movement capaci-
ties, were more able to run away, hide, or fight. Thus, the very first animals 
almost were passive structures, or made of primitive nervous systems that 
reacted directly to simple stimuli, rather than processing complex informa-
tion (see also Wilson & Wilson, 2007). Eventually, sensory processes reacting 
directly to energies became less central and evolved through more complex 
configurations, requiring more efficient neural structures organizing move-
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ment at different cognitive levels (e.g., Wilson, Van Vugt, & O’Gorman, 
2008). Consistent with that, complex neural wiring developed to enable the 
increasingly difficult processing of external information. That was reflected 
in the capacity of generating virtual models of the reality that surrounded the 
organism. This also included representations of behaviour (haptic ones), and 
of the inner states of the organism itself (proprioception).
Once the capacity to adapt behaviourally developed for feeding, then it 
was used for other purposes. One of them was the control of the inner pro-
cesses (e.g., Richards, 1987). Animals do not use passive systems to move the 
fluids inside of them, they use active pumping systems (such as the heart and 
cardiovascular system, the digestive system, or the lymphatic system). More 
conscious and motivated behavioural patterns also were developed, and put 
into the service of other biological processes, but with more social implica-
tions (see, for example, recent works on an evolutionary account of leader-
ship in human groups; e.g., Van Vugt, Hogan, & Kaiser, 2008). The first 
one is reproduction, which instead of using the passive release of masculine 
gametes to the air, like plants do, used active behaviours that brought them 
in contact with the feminine ones. Another behaviour that emerged as car-
nivorous predation evolved, was predator avoidance. That is, the behaviours 
that helped prey evade being killed and eaten by a predator, such as running 
away, hiding, or closing ranks in group to face external threats. Caring for the 
new-born or immature descendants is another aspect that developed. Territo-
rial behaviours also evolved (e.g., Taylor, 1988). These are related to either 
the caring of food resources or defending mates, in particular, for male indi-
viduals (for a more detailed review of the concept of territoriality in human 
groups see, for example, Sommer, 2004). Finally, the development of com-
plex social behaviour, with all its advantages, evolved and acquired increased 
complexity during the course of human history (e.g, Van Vugt, 2006).
3.  The perceptual stage
In the perceptual stage, sensory memory is important in processing the 
information required for visual, sound, haptic and olfactory perception (e.g., 
Hochberg, 1968; Harer, 1970; Phillips, 1974; Näätänen & Winkler, 1999; 
Wilson & Stevenson, 2003; Pasternak & Greenlee, 2005; Gallace & Spence, 
2009). This kind of memory is needed because stimuli act instantaneously 
and the brain requires time and a buffer to hold the information while it is 
being processed. Three kinds of sensory memory have been identified: one 
for vision, one for audition, and one for the haptic system (Sperling, 1960; 
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Averbach & Coriell, 1961; Eriksen & Johnson, 1964; Bliss, Crane, Mans-
field & Townsend, 1966; Neisser, 1967; Darwin, Turvey, & Crowder, 1972). 
They have been called iconic, echoic, and tactual. Sight is the archetypal 
sensory system for our species, Homo Sapiens, due to the fact that photons 
show little dispersion, so that sight is an excellent mechanism to provide the 
information required to build a model of the distribution of matter in space. 
The perception of movement and of causality were the first opportunity 
to use the second level of processing, the imaginal one, to supplement the per-
ceptual construction of virtual reality. Once that a virtual reality representa-
tion is constructed, the valuation processes and the interaction with the other 
processing levels take place. The perception of movement and the perception 
of causality includes the use of images to retain previous icons, to integrate the 
process of perception in time. Movement is the displacement of an object in 
different directions. Gibson (1979) has developed an analysis of the changes 
of size, shape, and position that objects experience, as they move in different 
directions. The perception of causality is related to the correct perception of 
timing in movements and relationships among objects (Michotte, 1963). 
The perception of the environment is obtained through the construc-
tion of virtual reality models as a way to be able to respond to reality itself. 
It is an efficient way to adapt to reality, even when the input conveys too 
limited information. However, it requires a more complex process to extract 
information to have an adequate representation of the environment. The 
auditory nervous system processes the incoming information and then uses it 
to establish patterns. These patterns are virtual reality models of the sound. It 
allows for the prevention of dangers due to the movement of something (for 
example, something falling upon you, or a predator or assailant approaching 
you). The fundamental utility of hearing is that animals produce noises with 
the aim of communication. Sounds of language are perceived both by the 
emitter and the person or persons who listen to the communication, if there 
is any. They allow for the transmission of information in a very efficient way.
The haptic system provides a way of getting information from the 
objects at the moment of getting contact with them, and also a way of per-
ceiving one’s own movements in space. It also serves for the perception of the 
motor part of emotions, like trembling, for example. Likewise, the proprio-
ceptive system permits humans to become aware of inner states, and thus is 
related to biological needs like hunger, thirst, and so forth. 
Thus, the perceptual system allows organisms to get information to 
form a model of the surrounding reality, and to adaptively respond to this 
reality. This reaction is not directly to the reality itself, but mediated by the 
construction of the virtual reality models, that approximate reality itself, even 
though, at times there may be discrepancies and contradictions. The percep-
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tual system is advanced enough in most species, and allows them to move 
easily in, and adapt efficiently to, the environment.
3.1.  Valuation in the perceptual stage
To be useful, perceptual information needs valuation so that the organism 
can discriminate its adaptive implications. The solution for this was provided 
by natural selection by adding a dimension to perception that is the product 
of a cognitive computation of the adaptive value of what is being perceived. 
Thus, in the case of the perception of an animal, it is an immediate response, 
which is the result of a computation of what is being seen is a prey, a predator 
or an animal without implication for survival.
Some of these computations are innate, for example, the disgust caused 
by a fetid odour, like excrement or a rotting dead animal, or the pleasure pro-
vided by the sweet taste of sugar or honey. For evolution, in terms of natural 
selection, this may be understood as the selection of this computation as a 
way to avoid proximity to the bacteria of decomposing organic matter, there 
being danger of an infection; or the behaviour in which one seeks food with 
a high caloric value, a source of energy necessary for organisms’ functioning. 
The pleasure-displeasure dimension, thus, establishes the adaptive value 
of objects, processes, and situations. Pleasure directs the animal’s pursuit of 
adaptive situations, like food, water, sex, warm environments, comfort, and 
so forth. However, there are circumstances that make these values accessible 
or that impede, deplete, or otherwise disrupt the access of positive, or avoid-
ance of negative, values. In these circumstances, it is rewarding to get control. 
Control depends on the power that the supporting or thwarting processes 
has, and the power with which the animal is endowed.
For example, all animals, including humans, like to eat or have sex. 
However, there might be other members of one’s own species searching for 
food or a mate. In this case, what they seek is control over the territory, 
which has been called territorial behaviour. They drive away potential food 
depleters or sexual competitors. Thus, the perception of control is an intri-
cate process that requires understanding a complex of relationships. Even 
though there are some automatic emotional responses, such as the anger and 
barking behaviour of a dog when someone strange enters its territory. 
At the perceptual stage, valuation is subject to processes such as condi-
tioning, contrast, habituation, and imprinting. We argue that what is being 
transferred from one perception to another, for example, through condition-
ing, can be defined as valuation, and that the response is part of the emo-
tional reaction to stimuli’s valuation. We consider that many of the auto-
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matic responses, such as reflexes, are emotional responses of some sort.
Contrast is another process that affects valuation and the related emo-
tional response. A circle alone looks smaller if it is surrounded by a set of other 
smaller circles. A famous experiment by Bruner and Goodman (1947) show 
that values affect size perceptions: the perceived size of coins is overestimated 
compared to their real size, while the same does not occur with neutral card-
board disks. Imprinting was extended by Lorenz (1952) as the way new-born 
animals create a bond with their mother or to whatever is moving near them. 
Perceptual valuation, thus, is the way through which natural selec-
tion makes available the capacity for the organism for distinguish between 
adaptive, non adaptive, and neutral situations. However, it can be devised 
as a magnitude, and goes from an extremely beneficial level to an extremely 
harmful one, in a continuous way from one extreme to the other. The qual-
ity of this dimension of being graduated quantitatively, makes it likely to 
be conceived as being a force or an energy in the organism. Its magnitude, 
however, is perceived as any other magnitude of the environment such as 
size, speed, saturation of colour, and so forth. 
4.  The imaginal stage
Another adaptation mechanism is related to the use of the virtual reality 
model construction capacity that evolved in response to reality in the absence 
of the direct stimuli and their informational input at the moment of action. 
This can be seen clearly for vision in the phi phenomenon of the Gestalt 
Psychologists (see Westheimer, 1999; Steinman, Pizlo & Pizlo, 2000). In a 
dark room, researchers turned on a light and immediately turned it off, and 
a few milliseconds later a second light placed somewhat ahead was turned on 
and off. What subjects saw was not two lights on and off in succession, but 
a single light moving from one place to another. This is the same method 
that is used by cinematography and video on TV, where what we see is not 
a series of snap shots, but a scene in movement. Michotte (1963) studied 
the perception of causality, which also has to do with the integration of the 
events in time. If an object moves toward a second one, and then when it 
touches it stops, and the second one starts moving, what is perceived is that 
the first one caused the motion of the second. These events are a part of the 
perception process itself, and the only difference is that the perceiver is using 
a model to retain the information for comparison with other events that 
happen afterwards, when the stimulus that brings the information about it 
is gone already. 
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Another process for the construction of virtual reality models when the 
stimulus is gone is related to the creation of expectations. This corresponds 
to operant conditioning in behaviourist theories. When we do something, 
usually we receive feedback about our actions; that is, we perceive the results 
of what we performed. Thus, when we act, we have three phases in sequence: 
the first is the perception of a situation, the second is the haptic perception 
of the action, and then the perception of the consequences. This sequence 
is recovered the next time we face the same situation, through a learning 
process. It starts when we perceive and recognize the situation, and then we 
recover the virtual representation of a previous sequence. This retrieval of 
the image of the action and its consequence is what activates the program 
for that action. There is some low-level abstraction here, which implies that 
the response to the situation may be given even if the situations are not 
identical. 
In this way, expectations can be generated by retaining the virtual 
reality model of a sequence of action, including the perception of causality, 
and that provides the cognitive system with the necessary information to 
implement future actions. This type of action can come from very short or 
complex sequences structured over a large space and time, and with many 
actions interconnected. What is important is that animals, including people, 
anticipate the consequences of what they are going to do. Tolman (1948) 
conceptualized these kind of actions as means-end-readiness, which would 
be cognitive structures implementing actions for a goal. In this way, we 
integrate information from perceptual experiences of places, which might 
include the haptic perceived actions. The same thing is true for other kinds 
of circumstances. Maps are one kind of schema, which is a virtual reality rep-
resentation of some aspects of the world, organizing perceptions and actions. 
When models and images are kept long enough in consciousness, they 
pass on to permanent storage, from which they can be retrieved. The retrieval 
is a process of reconstruction of an image from stored clues. In general, the 
essential function of memory is to keep alive images that then can be used to 
guide behaviour, even after information input has gone. We can recover from 
long term imaginal memory action sequences or operations. Piaget (1954), 
for example, argued that operations integrate in sequences, and when they 
turn into integrated systems, they can establish accurate representations of 
processes or phenomena. These processes also might be seen as an explana-
tion of what has been defined as intuitive thinking, and can account for 
the mechanisms through which people might solve problems without using 
abstract conceptual relations. Dual process accounts of impression formation 
also might be mentioned as compatible with the imaginal stage in the repre-
sentation and construction of reality (e.g., Brewer, 1988). 
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4.1.  Valuation in the imaginal stage
Valuation operates also in the imaginal stage. Values are attributed to situa-
tions, expectations, and consequences of actions. The situations or the con-
sequences of actions might have positive (pleasant) or negative (disagreeable) 
value, and this could be actual, such as getting a reward or a punishment, or 
expected, such as the withdrawal of a reward or the withdrawal of a punish-
ment. Values also can produce conflicts since there may be opposite values in 
a perceived situation. These processes were well illustrated in classical experi-
ments by Miller and colleagues (Miller & Murray, 1952; Murray & Miller, 
1952), where rats were rewarded with food and later punished with elec-
tric shock in the very same place. Approach and avoidance gradients from 
rewards and punishments were measured using a dynamometer, showing the 
existence of an asymmetrical pattern in approach vs. avoidance reactions.
Valuation at the imagined level is affected by similar factors as in the 
perceptual stage such as conditioning, contrast, and habituation, and might 
be related to working memory and short-term procedural memory, and 
might be linked to the process through which models are retrieved from 
memory for specific tasks. Valuation might also be important in relation to 
creative processes, for example, in the cognitive manipulation of images. 
5.  The abstract stage
Abstraction is the third and last stage in information processing. This stage 
is present fully only in Homo Sapiens, although other species may have an 
incipient conceptualizing processes. This level of cognitive processing is con-
sidered as the process that mostly makes a difference between human and 
other species, as it allows for complex representations of reality in abstract 
terms. Other species, such as chimpanzees, dolphins, octopus, crows, also 
show skills that may imply the use of abstract thinking, although there still is 
much debate and controversy over this issue. In line with dual process theo-
ries, however, it seems plausible to argue that only humans can engage in the 
forms of abstract hypothetical thought that underlie many human activities, 
such as science or literature, and which are connected typically to «Type 2» 
thinking (e.g., Stanovich, 2011; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). 
Abstract thinking is the process of combining abstract concepts to rep-
resent the relationships of classes of things in reality. To be able to think 
abstractly, people have to be able to generate abstract concepts. To be able to 
think abstractly, people have to attend to specific traits and construct a virtual 
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reality model, the prototype, which includes the most essential common fea-
tures of a class, using information stored by means of virtual reality models. 
Concepts, thus, depend on the ability to attend selectively to features of per-
ceived objects and then use the stored imaginal information, to be able to 
find the features that define a given class. That implies using the capacity 
to attend selectively to features or dimensions of the reality. Earlier theories 
in psychology or logic proposed that concepts are defined by establishing 
rules to determine the members of a category, with well-defined limits. Later 
on, Rosch (1977) conceptualized the process of concept formation in terms 
of prototypes, which are defined as exemplars that contain the most typical 
traits for a given category.
Abstract thinking also is related to language. Language is a capac-
ity that evolved in humans, and which allows the transmission of abstract 
thinking to other members of the species. Abstract thinking was acquired 
in the course of evolution, resulting in the ability to construct and use more 
efficient technologies. Humans needed to plan the construction of tools for 
their survival, and to understand mutually and share the functioning and 
the ways to construct them. Instead of simple sequences of expectancies, it 
might have been more advantageous to have abstract representations of the 
pertinent principles. To be able to do the task collectively, this understand-
ing had to be shared, leading to the evolution of language. Language, thus, 
has enabled the human species to have a shared abstract conception of the 
world. Abstract thinking then might be seen as one of most important of 
human evolutionary changes, and with language, it made possible the devel-
opment and transmission of complex cultures. It is also worth noting that 
international debate on abstract concepts has become particularly hot in the 
last 5-10 years, also due to the spread of embodied and grounded theories 
of human cognition. In line with these views, recent evidence suggests that 
observing objects and actions activates a simulation, and that concrete con-
cepts and words might be grounded in perception and action systems (e.g., 
Fischer & Zwaan, 2008; Barsalou, 2010; Borghi & Cimatti, 2010; Glenberg 
& Gallese, 2012; Ostarek & Huettig, 2017).
5.1.  Valuation in the abstract stage
Valuation in the abstract stage works in relation to language use. Adjectives, 
for example, are terms that refer to properties that have value. Sometimes the 
value might be implicit and depend on the understanding of the implica-
tions of what has been said. For example, defining nuclear radiation as per-
taining to the category of «natural» implicitly conveys a more positive value 
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to nuclear energy, and this operation can be used rhetorically to commu-
nicate or to persuade other people about its necessity or acceptability (e.g., 
Reicher et al., 1993). The valuation attributes of abstract entities, through 
which we develop abstract value systems, also are linked to language, and this 
be used as a direct tool for investigation, such as in the well-known semantic 
differential technique developed by Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (1957). 
This technique may be applied usefully to evaluate abstract concepts, as well 
as imaginal situations related to them, or direct experiences at the perceptual 
level.
The abstract valuation process has the potential of storing great amounts 
of information, which by its property of being abstract, applies to many cir-
cumstances. In this level, we have an abstract model of reality, that we use to 
adapt to it, for example, through long-term semantic memory. The abstract 
stage also might provide tools for the behavioural regulation, through the 
emergence of what is known as voluntary control. In this sense, planning and 
decision making also are related to abstract valuation (e.g., Sugrue, Corrado, 
& Newsome, 2005). Decision making emerges at the imaginal level when 
animals become aware of different alternatives of reward, but it is enhanced 
at the abstract level, with the possibility of representing, more clearly, a wider 
set of alternatives. It has been suggested that, when making simple choices, 
humans are able to use statistically optimal decision-making processes, 
because of an evolutionary pressure to increase the speed and accuracy of 
decisions, and the likelihood of getting positive rewards for correct choices 
(e.g., Bogacz, 2007). To reach these rewards, however, alternatives that never 
have been experienced, or that do not exist, including ideal ones, also can be 
constructed, such as in forecasting procedures or long-term scenario develop-
ment exercises. In this sense, planning is important not only for attending 
specific concrete tasks, but also for deciding what steps have to be taken to 
get to a desired product, outcome, or state at a more abstract level (see, for 
example, Gilbert, Gill, & Wilson, 2002). 
6.  Interactions
The three levels of valuation operate in constant interaction. When we per-
ceive something, we immediately pass it to short term or working memory 
storage, when we are directly involved and attentive to it; if not, experiences 
will fade away from consciousness. Attended perceptions get additional 
meaning from the imaginal and the abstract levels. From the imaginal level, 
we may retrieve a related memory from episodic long-term storage, or we 
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may activate one or more expectancies. That gives a person the feeling of 
what can be done with or about the object, experience, situation, or process 
in question. A given perception may get in contact with one or several classes 
from the abstract level, and that gives meaning to the perception outcome. 
Widely known anecdotal accounts for important scientific discoveries or 
theoretical revolutions can be mentioned as examples of this kind of process 
(e.g., Kekulé’s solving the structure of the benzene ring during a daydream, 
in which he saw a snake biting its tail, thus forming the ring; or Einstein’s 
thought experiments, such as the one in which he imagined having an entire 
physics laboratory inside an elevator).
We also retrieve all the attributes related to perceptions and imagina-
tions, through associative mechanisms, as it has been frequently conceptual-
ized by dual process accounts of human social cognition (e.g., Fazio, 2001; 
Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Thus, from imaginal processes, an abstract rep-
resentation of something may be achieved through associations. The iconic 
value of seeing conceptual or imaginal relations and processes by means of 
graphic representations or drawings, has been highlighted frequently as an 
example of this process. That is, we use the perceptual level to convey and 
clarify conceptual relations at the abstract level. Illustrations, therefore, have 
demonstrated a privileged place in the development of human cultures, 
either just to help imagining of situations described in a text, or for the more 
complex side of conveying abstraction by means of concrete conceptual 
examples.
7.  Implications for educational and psychological 
 research in the environmental domain
In this paper, we have presented a general psychological theoretical proposal, 
which might find applications in different applied areas of psychology: edu-
cational, environmental, and social. We discuss, in particular, its implications 
for the field of environmental education and environmental psychology (e.g., 
Bonnes & Carrus, 2004; Clayton, 2012). All the applications in this field 
of inquiry imply the valuation that human subjects make about the features 
of their milieu and daily life environments, in view of a more aware self-
regulation of personal behaviour in the context of social interaction (e.g., 
Guéguen & Stefan, 2016). 
Motivation and valuation processes in relation to the three different 
levels discussed here (i.e., perception, imagination and abstraction), indeed, 
are key factors to understand and explain self-regulation and behavioural 
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control as the basis of positive outcomes and efficacy within the learning 
and the education process, considering the micro-system and the mesosys-
tem of the education process, according to ecological theories of human 
development (e.g., Bronfenbrenner, 1979). These concepts might be relevant 
to understand more deeply current human behaviour in relation to climate 
change (e.g., Reser & Swim, 2011), which, in turn, is a key process for cur-
rent environmental education and for the promotion of sustainability.
These aspects are important first of all the social interaction that occurs 
directly in the educational contexts, either indoors in the classroom, or out-
doors in other educational spaces, such as playgrounds or school gardens (see 
for example Carrus et al., 2015). In addition, the issue of more aware and 
«mindful» information processing regarding the value attributed to one’s own 
perception, imagination, and abstractions is relevant to understand pupils’ 
and students’ cognitions and behaviours outside the education context. This 
might be particularly relevant for promoting the capacity of considering the 
future consequences of one’s own actions, in relation to other human beings, 
to other species, and to ecosystems in general (e.g., Strathman et al., 1994). 
The implications of cognitive and social conceptualizations about time and 
space also have been suggested by some authors in the field of environmental 
psychology, and this might have a strong relevance to environmental educa-
tion practices (e.g., Corral-Verdugo, Fraijo-Sing, & Pinheiro, 2006). 
Furthermore, we argue here that, in addition to the educational con-
text, the present theoretical proposal advanced here is relevant to understand 
better the relation between the person and the environment. In fact, under-
standing the interaction between individual level perceptions and cognitions, 
the built environment and human-made ecological habitats, and the behav-
ioural aspects of environmental sustainability and natural resource conserva-
tion, requires an understanding of human valuation processes. An example 
in this domain is crowding, an issue that has been found to affect quality of 
life and human relations in different kinds of environments. Crowding has 
to do with the negative valuation of perceived density in a given space; the 
perception of loss of control, and the great volume of information that enters 
the perceptual system of subjects is a relevant part of this valuation process. 
Based on the huge literature about crowding in environmental psychology, 
it would be interesting to carry out studies adopting the three-level valua-
tion approach that we propose here. Landscape assessment and restorative 
environments also could be interesting arenas to apply valuation theory, as 
it has been shown how variables at different levels (e.g., individual, social 
or developmental) may interact in affecting the relation between the per-
ceived restorativeness of a given environment and the subjective wellbeing 
of its users. This explains the capacity of different restorative experiences to 
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improve the quality of human life in daily life settings (e.g., Carrus et al., 
2017).
Another area that might benefit from this approach is the study of cli-
mate change perceptions and evaluation. It has been suggested how a more 
accurate knowledge and interpretation of climate change phenomena, such 
as global warming, could be an important predictor of resource conserva-
tion behaviour (e.g., Doherty & Clayton, 2011; Gifford, 2011). Therefore, 
knowledge itself certainly might be an important variable to focus on, to 
understand and predict human sustainable behaviour. However, it also is 
important to take into account the value implications of knowledge, in addi-
tion to its propositional structure. In the case of the study of public opin-
ion on climate change, we might distinguish between the facts that have 
been established from the value system that derives, by implication, from 
such facts. Recent studies, indeed, suggest that mindfulness, or cognitive 
reappraisal, which could be seen as two processes implied in a strict rela-
tion between the perceptual, imaginal, and abstract stage of internal mental 
state valuations, could be a predictor of climate perceptions; this, in turn, 
positively predicts individual ecological behaviour (e.g., Panno et al., 2015; 
Panno et al., 2017). Valuations at the perceptual and imaginal level also 
might be considered in this case, as they may have different implications for 
explaining drivers of, and barriers to, human action in relation to climate 
change. They also could allow for explaining the relations between climate 
change perceptions, human social cognition, and wellbeing (e.g., Panno et 
al., 2017). 
Finally, it is important to underline the potential of the present theo-
retical reflections in the applied educational field. By recognising the dis-
tinction among the three different stages of valuation in human perception 
and cognition, it could be possible to customize the educational tools and 
practices according to the targeted domain in the learning process involved 
in the education experience, as well as according to the distinct developmen-
tal challenges that the learners are facing in their specific lifespan trajectory. 
Also, it is arguable to envisage more ecologically valid and realistic forms of 
knowledge transmission and co-production, if the three stages consistently 
are taken into account in the teacher-student relationship, so that students 
and pupils can be involved in learning situations that allow for the expression 
and the development of pragmatic bottom-up competencies, not only top-
down procedural knowledge abilities. Likewise, we want to underscore here 
that a more aware and mindful approach (e.g., Roeser et al., 2012; see also 
Barth, 2001), in terms of the different levels involved in students’ percep-
tions and processing of the external stimuli, could help education profession-
als to develop and maintain a positive social climate in the learning settings. 
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Riassunto
In questo lavoro viene proposto un nuovo approccio al tema delle teorie sulla motivazione, 
sulla base di una prospettiva cognitivista, attraverso il concetto di valutazione. Motivazio-
ne e valutazione vengo passate in rassegna e discusse alla luce di una prospettiva ambienta-
le, evolutiva ed evoluzionista. Nella proposta teorica qui avanzata si vuole sostenere come 
la motivazione possa essere considerata semplicemente come uno dei vari meccanismi che 
compongono i processi cognitivi, essendo legata al valore adattivo del rapporto tra persone 
e oggetti, situazioni e contesti. La motivazione e la valutazione vengono proposte come og-
getti percepiti, immaginati e concettualizzati del processo di cognizione. Pertanto, la moti-
vazione viene assunta come il prodotto di un complesso processo di computazione cognitiva, 
che determina il valore adattivo delle nostre cognizioni, e fornisce una risposta valutati-
va. Vengono infine discusse le dimensioni percettive, cognitive e simboliche del processo di 
valutazione, e vengono identificate le implicazioni della presente proposta teorica per lo 
sviluppo futuro della ricerca di base e applicata nel campo della psicologia ambientale e 
dell’educazione ambientale.
Parole chiave: Cognizione, Educazione ambientale, Motivazione, Percezione, Psi-
cologia ambientale, Valutazione.
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